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LAW-VERNON'S ANNOTATED TEXAS CIVIL STAT-

UTES ARTICLE 2338-1, SECTION 3(f), DEFINING DELINQUENT CHILD As

ONE WHO "HABITUALLY So DEPORTS HIMSELF As To INJURE OR
ENDANGER THE MORALS OR HEALTH OF HIMSELF OR OTHERS,"
Is NOT UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE. E.S.G. v. State, 447 S.W.2d 225

(Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
Appellant, a girl fourteen years old, was away from home for days at a
time, living with another girl reputed to be a prostitute. On one occasion appellant's mother and a policeman located her in a downtown
transient apartment with a young adult male. She had been away from
home for over a week. The juvenile court found appellant to be a juvenile delinquent within the statutory definition providing that a delinquent child is one who "habitually so deports himself as to injure or
endanger the morals or health of himself or others."1 Held-Affirmed.
Texas Revised Civil Statutes Annotated, article 2338-1, section 3(f) is
not unconstitutionally vague.
In 1943, the Texas Legislature adopted the Juvenile Act, 2 setting
forth the procedure for handling delinquent children in Texas. The
purpose of the Juvenile Act is "to secure for each child under its jurisdiction such care, guidance and control, preferably in his own home, as
' 3
will serve the child's welfare and the best interests of the State.
The Act defines a "child" as any female person over the age of ten
years and under the age of eighteen years and any male person over
the age of ten years and under the age of seventeen years, 4 and defines
a delinquent child as any child who
(a) violates any penal law of this state of the grade of felony; or
(b) violates any penal law of this state of the grade of misdemeanor
where the punishment prescribed for such offense may be by
confinement in jail; or
(c) habitually violates any penal law of this state of the grade of
misdemeanor where the punishment prescribed for such offense
is by pecuniary fine only; or
(d) habitually violates any penal ordinance of a political subdivision of this state; or
(e) habitually violates a compulsory school attendance law of this
state; or
1 TEx. REV. CIV. STAT.
2 Tax. REV. CiV. STAT.
3 TEX. REV. CIV. STAT.
4TEx. REV. CIV. STAT.

ANN. art. 2338-1, § 3 () (1964).
ANN. art. 2538-1 (1964).
ANN. art. 2338-1, § 1 (1964).

ANN. art. 2338-1, § 3 (1964).
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(f) habitually so deports himself as to injure or endanger the
morals or health of himself or others; or
(g) habitually associates with vicious and immoral persons.5
Texas courts have held that when the acts committed by the juvenile
fall into one of the definitions other than subsection (a) or (b) above,
he becomes a delinquent child only by "habitually" performing the
act or acts prohibited by the statute. 6
The Act further provides:
(1) No adjudication upon the status of any child in the jurisdiction
of the juvenile court shall operate to impose any of the civil
disabilities ordinarily imposed by conviction, nor shall any
child be deemed a criminal by reason of such adjudication,
nor shall such adjudication be deemed a conviction, nor shall
any child be charged with or convicted of any crime except
perjury in any court except as provided in Section 6 of this Act.
(2) The disposition of a child or any evidence given in the court
shall not be admissible as evidence against the child in any
case or proceeding in any court other than the juvenile court,
nor shall such disposition or evidence operate to disqualify a
child in any further civil service examination, appointment or
application. However, nothing in this subsection prevents a
showing before the district court or the grand jury that the
for criminal proceedings under
child has been transferred
7
Section 6 of this Act.
The judicial interpretations of the purposes of the Act in Texas
vary to some degree, but may be generally stated as follows: (1) "the
underlying purpose is to guide and direct juveniles; not to convict
and punish them"; 8 (2) "to transfer jurisdiction over delinquent children from criminal courts to civil courts"; 9 (3) "to change the method
of handling delinquent children from criminal to civil procedure." 10
These interpretations were somewhat jolted in 1967 when the Supreme Court of the United States set forth the Gault decision, 1 the
effects of which have yet to be fully determined. In its detailed analysis
of the juvenile system in the State of Arizona, the Court concluded
that the juvenile offender had the rights: (1) to adequate notice of the
5 Id.
6Ex parte Yelton, 298 S.W.2d 285 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1957, no writ).

7 TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2338-1, § 13. (d) and § 13 (e) (1964).
8 State v. Thomasson, 154 Tex. 151, 275 S.W.2d 463 (1955).

9 d.; In the Matter of Gonzales, 328 S.W.2d 475 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1959 writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
10 State v. Thomasson, 154 Tex. 151, 275 S.W.2d 463 (1955); Hultin v. State, 171 Tex.
Crim. 425, 351 S.W.2d 248 (1961).
11 Application of Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S. Ct. 1428, 18 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1967).
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proceeding, (2) to counsel, (3) to confrontation and to cross-examination
of witnesses, and (4) to privilege against self-incrimination. 12 Though
the Court in Gault explicitly limited its holding to the adjudicatory
stage of the juvenile proceeding," the Court's opinion attacked the
whole system for the treatment of juveniles and its underlying purposes
when it stated:
Failure to observe the fundamental requirements of due process
has resulted in instances, which might have been avoided, of unfairness to individuals and inadequate or inaccurate findings of fact
and unfortunate prescriptions of remedy. Due process of law is the
primary and indispensable foundation of individual freedom. It is
the basic and essential term in the social compact which defines the
rights of the individual and delimits the powers which the state
may exercise. 14
In referring to the benefits received by juvenile delinquents, similar to
those set out in section 13(3) of article 2338-1,'15 the Court pointed
out that: "the observance of due process standards, intelligently and not
ruthlessly administered, will not compel the States to abandon or displace any of the substantive benefits of the juvenile process."' 6
The effects of Gault on the juvenile law in Texas may be seen by a
brief analysis of a few Texas cases that have interpreted it. In Leach v.
State'17 the Houston Court of Civil Appeals (14th Dist.), reversed the
commitment of a child charged under section 3(f) of article 2338-1
and committed by the juvenile court upon the testimony of a probation officer who admittedly failed to inform the child she had a right to
an attorney. The majority opinion, though not ruling on the constitutionality of section 3(f) of article 2338-1, gave the following interpretation of Gault: "In re Gault requires that the same principles applicable
to adults be applied to juveniles in this type of case when the question
reaches constitutional dimensions."' 8 The court in Leach also pointed
out that no witness should be permitted to testify as to whether the
child being tried measures up to the standard or the conduct provided
in article 2338-1, section 3(f).1
On another occasion, the same court that rendered the opinion in
the Leach case held in Collins v. State20 that while a juvenile proceed12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Id.

15
16
17
18

TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2338-1, § 13 (8) (1964).
Application of Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S. Ct. 1428, 18 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1967).
428 S.W.2d 817 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1968, no writ).
Id.

19 Id.

20 Collins v. State, 429 S.W.2d 650 (rex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1968, no writ),
citing Application of Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S. Ct. 1428, 18 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1967).
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ing is a civil proceeding, "since it is a proceeding which seeks to deprive
the defendant of his liberty, the defendant is guaranteed all of the
privileges and immunities which he would have if it were a criminal
proceeding."
Finally, in 1969, the Supreme Court of Texas was called upon to
give its interpretation of Gault in State v. Santana.21 It should be
pointed out that the holding in Collins was expressly disapproved by
the Supreme Court of Texas, since the court stated:
It is stongly urged here and in some contemporaneous writings
that the opinion in Gault means that a juvenile proceeding which
may end in depriving a person of his liberty, is, in reality, a criminal trial; and that to satisfy the due process and equal protection
clauses, juvenile proceedings must be accompanied by all of the
same measures and protections afforded in criminal trials. We do
not so read Gault. The Gault opinion goes out of its way to say it
does not mean to so hold.22
In State v. Santana, the court held that the Constitution of the
United States did not require that juvenile trial be adversary in nature
and that the "beyond a reasonable doubt" test was not required for
findings therein. 23 In its opinion, the court gave the following interpretation of Gault:
We ascribe to the Gault Court not a desire to abolish the attempt
of the state to treat and rehabilitate the child through juvenile
proceedings, but a laudable mandate that in juvenile proceedings,
the rights of the child be preserved; that the proceedings be conducted with basic fairness. Instead of the worst of both worlds
under the abused juvenile proceedings, the Gault court, it is
thought, desired to preserve the best of both worlds for the minor;
i.e., the individual, particularized treatment of the disturbed, rebellious or wayward minor, while at the same time, insuring that
the hearings be conducted with dignity and fairness and with the
24
essentials of due process being observed.
Thus, the court accepted the view of the Supreme Court of the United
States, as set forth in Kent v. United States,25 that the hearing did not
have to conform with all of the requirements of a criminal trial, but
that it must measure up to the essentials of due process.
In giving the above interpretation, the Texas court said: "The policy
of the juvenile laws has been fixed by the Texas Legislature; and we
21 444 S.W.2d 614 (Tex. Sup. 1969), judgment vacated, 38 U.S.L.W. 3401 (April 24, 1970).
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Id. See In the Matter of Winship, -

U.S. -, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 383 U.S. 541, 86 S. Ct. 1045, 16 L. Ed. 2d 84 (1966).
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conceive it to be our duty to uphold the spirit of that law while at the
same time insuring to minors the basically fair proceedings required
by Gault and the Constitutions of Texas and the United States." 26 In
effect, the Supreme Court of Texas stated that a juvenile delinquent
is entitled to the "best of both worlds," i.e., the essentials of due process,
and the substantive benefits accorded juveniles under article 2338-1,
namely, section 13(3), and the treatment of the case as a civil case. At
the same time, the court denied the juvenile the protection heretofore
accorded adults, namely, that the evidence establish "beyond a reasonable doubt ' 2 T that the adult has committed the act complained of.
In E.S.G. v. State, the San Antonio Court of Civil Appeals held that
article 2338-1, section 3(f) was not unconstitutionally vague. 28 In support of its holding, the majority of the court set forth the following
reasons: (1) "In thirty-three States a child can be found delinquent
if he is guilty of immoral conduct, and the various States' definitions of
immoral conduct are all somewhat similar to section 3(f)." (2) "The
need to correct habits and patterns of behavior which are injurious to
the health or morals of the child goes to the very heart of our Juvenile
Act." (3) "This case history illustrates the need for a provision such
as found in Sec. 3(f)." and (4) "[S]ince the petition filed under section
3(f) must allege the specific acts of conduct which brings the child
within the prohibited behavior. This protects the rights of the child
2
in the adjudicatory stage of the proceedings.
On the other hand, the dissenting opinion dealt in a more direct
manner with the issue before the court, that issue being whether the
essentials of due process must be accorded juveniles in the pre-adjudicatory stage of the proceedings. Notwithstanding the holding that section
3(f) of article 2338-1 is unconstitutionally vague, the dissent points out
the following: (1) "If a statute is, in reality, not vague, the result
would be that, after the decision in the particular case, the statute is
sufficiently clear and precise to enable men of common intelligence and
understanding to determine what is prohibited and what is permissible." (2) "The application of less strict constitutional standards to
juvenile proceedings has sometimes been justified by distinguishing between proceedings, such as criminal cases, where the adjudication relates
to past conduct, and those cases, such as juvenile cases, where the purpose of the inquiry is to determine a present or future condition. The
distinction is, at best, illusory." and (3) section 3(f) "establishes the
judge or jury as the arbiter of the behavior and morals of every child.
26 State v. Santana, 444 S.W.2d 614 (rex. Sup. 1969).
27 TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. art. 9 (1952).
28 E.S.G. v. State, 447 S.W.2d 225 (rex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.)
29 Id.
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The situation is ripe for overreaching, for imposition of the judge's or
3' 0
jury's own code of youthful conduct.
At this point, mention must be made of the fact that recently, the
Supreme Court of the United States also refused to answer the question
that was presented to the Court in E.S.G. v. State. In State v. Mattiello,31
which involved a constitutional attack on a statute similar to the one
under attack in E.S.G., the appellate division of the circuit court affirmed the commitment of a juvenile under the statute that defined a
delinquent child as one "in manifest danger of falling into habits of
the petivice." The Supreme Court, after hearing argument, dismissed
32
tion for want of a properly presented federal question.
In order to provide a more complete treatment of the legal issue and
decision in E.S.G., it is necessary to set out briefly the law applicable to
an adult facing a conviction under a similar statute. To begin with,
article 1, section 10, of the Texas Constitution3 3 provides in part that
an accused shall have the right ". . . to demand the nature and cause of
the accusation against him, and to have a copy thereof. . . ." Under this
section of the constitution it has been held that the penal law creating
the offense with which the defendant is charged must be sufficiently
34
definite to be understood; otherwise, it is a violation of this provision.
This holding is in line with the holdings of the Supreme Court of the
United States,3 5 which generally are cited for the proposition that:
.. . the terms of a penal statute creating a new offense must be
sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it, what
conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties is
a well-recognized requirement, consonant alike with ordinary notions of fair play and the settled rules of law; and a statute which
either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague
that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates the first essential of
due process of law.86
In addition to the above mentioned provision in the Texas Constitution, article 6 of the Penal Code of Texas provides:
Whenever it appears that a provision of the penal law is so indefinitely framed or of such doubtful construction that it cannot be
80 Id.
3' 225 A.2d 507 (Conn. App. 1966).
82 MattielIo v. Connecticut, 395 U.S. 209, 89 S. Ct. 1767, 23 L. Ed. 2d 212 (1969).
88 TEx. CONST. art. 1, § 10.

Ex parte Meadows, 133 Tex. Crim. 292, 109 S.W.2d 1061 (1937).
85 Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 86 S. Ct. 518, 15 L. Ed. 2d 447 (1966); Musser
v. Utah, 333 U.S. 95, 68 S. Ct. 397, 92 L. Ed. 562 (1948); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 506
U.S. 451, 59 S. Ct. 618, 83 L. Ed. 888 (1939).
38 Connally v. General Const. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 46 S. Ct. 126, 70 L. Ed. 322 (1926).
84
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understood, either from the language in which it is expressed, or
from some other written law of the State, 'such penal law shall be
regarded as wholly inoperative.8
As was pointed out by the concurring opinion in Leach v. State,38
the Texas courts have consistently followed the proposition set forth
by the Supreme Court of the United States in the previously mentioned
Connally opinion;3 9 therefore, numerous Texas statutes have been held
40
unconstitutional due to their vagueness.
A close analysis of the law that has been mentioned to this point, and
of the majority opinion in the instant case, reveals a successful evasion
of the legal issue presented to the court for its determination. Instead
of stating whether a juvenile in Texas is entitled to the same "essen.tials of due process" accorded adults in the pre-adjudicatory stage of a
proceeding, the court merely stated that the juvenile is protected during
the adjudicatory stage, since a petition filed under section 3(f) of article
2338-141 must allege the specific conduct that brings the child within
the prohibited behavior. 42 It seems clear that the constitutional attack
on section 3(f) for vagueness necessarily involved a determination of
whether a juvenile was entitled to the same rights accorded adults in
the pre-adjudicatory stage; for by presenting such question before the
court, the appellant in effect asked the court to determine whether the
statutory definition in question was sufficient to give notice to all juveniles of what conduct is prohibited. It is no answer to such question to
state that the juvenile is protected since the petition must allege specific
acts of misconduct to bring the child within the prohibited behavior.
37 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. art. 6 (1952).
38 Leach v. State, 428 S.W.2d 817 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1968, no writ).
89 Connally v. General Const. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 46 S. Ct. 126, 70 L. Ed. 322 (1926).
40 The following are statutes that have been held unconstitutional in Texas due to
their vagueness: (1) a 1918 statute making a person driving a motor vehicle or motorcycle
toward an intersection of a public street or highway with railroad tracks, where the view
of the said crossings is obscured either wholly or partially, who fails to reduce the speed
of the vehicle not to exceed six miles per hour at some point not nearer than thirty feet
of such track, unless there are flagmen or gates showing way to be clear, is guilty of
misdemeanor. Graham v. Hines, 240 S.W. 1015 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1922, writ
ref'd); (2) a 1918 statute forbidding the operating or driving of motor vehicles on any
public highway where the territory contiguous thereto is closely built up, at greater
rate of speed than eighteen miles per hour. Ex parte Slaughter, 92 Tex. Crim. 212, 243
S.W. 478 (1922); (3) a 1925 statute declaring that whoever needlessly kills an animal is'
guilty of an offense. Cinadr v. State, 108 Tex. Crim. 147, 300 S.W. 64 (1927); (4) a 1925
statute denouncing a disturbance by one disguised in such a manner as to render identity
"difficult to determine." Anderson v. State, 113 Tex. Crim. 450, 21 S.W.2d 499 (1929);
(5) a statute providing that failure of any person, firm, etc., engaged in manufacturing,
distributing, etc., of liquid petroleum gas to comply within forty-eight hours after receipt
of order of the Railroad Commission to comply with statute regulating distribution of
such gas or any order of Railroad Commission, shall subject such person and officers and
executives of such named concerns to penalties. Eubanks v. State, 203 S.W.2d 339 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Austin 1947, writ ref'd).
41 TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2338-1, § 3 (f) (1964).
42 E.S.G. v. State, 447 S.W.2d 225 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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As was stated by the Supreme Court of the United States in Lanzetta v.
State of New Jersey,43 "[i]t is the statute, not the accusation under it,
that prescribes the rule to govern conduct and warns against transgression . .

" To state that "the need to correct habits and patterns of

behavior which are injurious to the health or morals of the child goes
to the very heart of our Juvenile Act ' 44 or that "the use of words of
general meaning is the essence of our code system, ' 45 does not provide
an answer to the legal issue before the court. As pointed out by the
Supreme Court in Lanzetta, the mere objective of the law does not
make a vague statute constitutional.46 In 1944, the Supreme Court of
Texas, while pointing out that the power to enact laws was vested in
the Legislature, stated: "If any law, or part thereof, undertakes to
nullify the protection furnished by the Constitution, such law, or part
' 47
thereof, that conflicts with the Constitution is void.
Another statement often used in defense of decisions such as the one
in the instant case is that a juvenile proceeding is a civil proceeding and
not a criminal proceeding. This view was expressly rejected by the
Supreme Court in Gault; and, as pointed out by the Supreme Court in
Giaccio v. Pennsylvania,48 regardless of whether an act is penal or civil
it must meet the due process requirements of the fourteenth amendment. In that case, the Court stated:
Both liberty and property are specifically protected by the Fourteenth Amendment against any state deprivation which does not
meet the standards of due-process, and this protection is not to be
avoided by the simple
label a state chooses to fasten upon its con49
duct or its statute.

Section 13(3) of article 2338-150 is also often mentioned in defense
of opinions such as the one in the instant case. However, as has been
pointed out, "it may be questioned whether these provisions of the Act
really work. Prosecutors in criminal cases always seem to know about
the juvenile record of the defendant and many prospective employers
also seem to get the word about them." 51 The majority opinion in Gault
also pointed to the above mentioned defects in the system and stated:
"there is no reason why the application
of due process requirements
' 52
provisions.
such
with
interfere
should
43 306 U.S. 451, 59 S. Ct. 618, 83 L. Ed. 888 (1939).
44 E.S.G. v. State, 447 S.W.2d 225 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
45 Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 59 S. Ct. 618, 83 L. Ed. 888 (1939).
46 Id.
47 Dendy v. Wilson, 142 Tex. 460, 179 S.W.2d 269 (1944).
48 382 U.S. 399, 86 S. Ct. 518, 15 L. Ed. 2d 447 (1966).
49

Id.

50 TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2338-1, § 13 (3) (1964).
51 Billings, The New Juvenile Delinquent Law, 31 TEx. B.J. 203 (1968).
52 Application of Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S. Ct. 1428, 18 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1967).
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